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Nonconscious recognition of facial expressions opens an intriguing
possibility that two emotions can be present together in one brain
with unconsciously and consciously perceived inputs interacting.
We investigated this interaction in three experiments by using a
hemianope patient with residual nonconscious vision. During si-
multaneous presentation of facial expressions to the intact and the
blind field, we measured interactions between conscious and
nonconsciously recognized images. Fear-specific congruence ef-
fects were expressed as enhanced neuronal activity in fusiform
gyrus, amygdala, and pulvinar. Nonconscious facial expressions
also influenced processing of consciously recognized emotional
voices. Emotional congruency between visual and an auditory
input enhances activity in amygdala and superior colliculus for
blind, relative to intact, field presentation of faces. Our findings
indicate that recognition of fear is mandatory and independent of
awareness. Most importantly, unconscious fear recognition re-
mains robust even in the light of a concurrent incongruent happy
facial expression or an emotional voice of which the observer is
aware.
amygdala  blindsight  affective blindsight  consciousness  nonconscious
processes
Facial expressions, most notably expressions of fear, can beprocessed in the absence of awareness (1–3). Studies of exper-
imentally induced nonconscious vision for facial expressions in
neurologically intact viewers provide evidence for differences in
brain activity for facial expressions of fear perceived with or without
awareness (4). Differences between aware and unaware stimulus
processing are also reflected in lateralization of amygdala activation
(left amygdala for seen, right for masked presentation) (1). The
existence of two processing pathways for fear stimuli is suggested
most dramatically by the brain’s response to facial expression of fear
that a hemianope patient is unable to see consequent upon striate
cortex damage (5–7). The fact that conscious and nonconscious
emotional cognition involves partially different brain networks
raises the possibility that the same brain at the same time may be
engaged in two modes of emotional processing, conscious and
nonconscious.
To understand how processing with and without awareness is
expressed at the level of brain function, we studied a patient with
complete loss of visual awareness in half the visual field due to a
unilateral striate cortex lesion, which produces blindness in the
contralateral visual field (8). It is now established that under
appropriate testing conditions some of these patients can accurately
guess the location or the identity of a stimulus (9) and discriminate
among different facial expressions (5, 7, 10). This residual visual
function is referred to as blindsight (11) or also affective blindsight
(5) when it concerns emotional signals like facial expressions.
Animal studies indicate that a phylogenetically ancient fear
system, at least in rodents, functions independently of a more
recently evolved geniculo-striate-based visual system (12). Neuro-
imaging evidence from humans has produced intriguing data
suggesting that a subcortical visual pathway comprising the superior
colliculus, posterior thalamus, and amygdala (7) may sustain affec-
tive blindsight. This route has been implicated in nonconscious
perception of facial expressions in neurologically intact observers
when a masking technique was used (13). Furthermore, recent
explorations of this phenomenon have suggested that the repre-
sentation of fear in faces is carried in the low spatial frequency
component of face stimuli, a component likely to be mediated via
a subcortical pathway (14, 15). It is perhaps no coincidence that the
residual visual abilities of cortically blind subjects are confined to
that range (16).
Affective blindsight creates unique conditions for investigating
on-line interactions between consciously and unconsciously per-
ceived emotional stimuli because two stimuli can be presented
simultaneously with the patient seeing only one of them and, thus,
is unaware of conflict. Although all experiments reported here
addressed the role of nonconscious processing of facial expressions
upon conscious recognition, it should be noted that each of them
is concerned with a different aspect of this question. Experiment 1
asks whether unseen facial expressions influence recognition of
seen facial expressions. Its design is similar to studies of the classical
redundant target effect (17). Recent studies have provided evi-
dence that the effect of a redundant stimulus on a target cannot be
explained by probability summation and instead suggests interhemi-
spheric cooperation and summation across hemispheres (6, 18, 19).
In Experiment 1, we tested for this effect under circumstances
where the subject was not aware of the presence of a second
stimulus and was requested to categorize the emotion expressed by
the seen face presented in the intact visual field (either a full face
or a hemiface). In Experiment 3, we used a crossmodal variant of
the redundant target effect by presenting the redundant emotional
information in the auditory modality simultaneously with the visual
stimulus. The situation is similar to that of Experiment 1 in the sense
that the goal is also to measure the influence of an unseen facial
expression on the target stimulus. Although in Experiment 1 the
target stimulus is visual (a facial expression), in Experiment 3, the
target stimulus is an emotional voice and, consequently, the influ-
ence of the unseen face is examined in the context of crossmodal
influences. Nevertheless, Experiments 1 and 3 are similar in so far
as for both cases the target stimulus (a face in Experiment 1 and a
voice in experiment 3) is presented simultaneously with a redundant
unseen visual stimulus and is consciously perceived. Previous results
in neurologically intact viewers provide evidence that simulta-
neously presented emotional voices influence how facial expres-
sions are processed and, furthermore, indicate that the amygdala
plays a critical role in binding visual and auditory-presented affec-
tive information. This binding is evident by increased activation to
fearful faces accompanied by voices that express fear (20–22). A
further question addressed in this study is whether affective blind-
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sight is restricted to facial expressions or extends to affective
pictures, and if so, whether unseen affective pictures influence
conscious processing of emotional voices. Thus, Experiment 2 paves
the way for Experiment 3, where we test for face specificity of this
nonconscious effect by presenting affective pictures (and faces) as
the redundant stimulus in combination with emotional voices (23).
Methods
Subject. Patient GY is a 45-year-old male who sustained damage to
the posterior left hemisphere of his brain caused by head injury (a
road accident) when he was 7 years old. The lesion (see ref. 24 for
an extensive structural and functional description of the lesion)
invades the left striate cortex (i.e., medial aspect of the left occipital
lobe, slightly anterior to the spared occipital pole, extending dor-
sally to the cuneus and ventrally to the lingual but not the fusiform
gyrus) and surrounding extra-striate cortex (inferior parietal lob-
ule). The location of the lesion is functionally confirmed by perim-
etry field tests (see ref. 24 for a description of GY’s perimetric field).
He has macular sparing extending 3° into his right (blind) hemifield.
Preliminary testing ensured that throughout all experiments the
materials and presentation conditions did not give rise to awareness
of the presence of a stimulus presented in the blind field. GY gave
informed consent to the present study, which was approved by the
local hospital ethics committee.
Data Acquisition. Neuroimaging data were acquired with a 2 T
Magnetom VISION whole-body MRI system (Siemens Medical
Systems, Erlangen, Germany) equipped with a head volume coil.
Contiguous multislice T2* weighted echoplanar images (EPIs) were
obtained by using a sequence that enhanced blood oxygenation
level-dependent contrast. Volumes covering the whole brain (48
slices; slice thickness 2 mm) were obtained every 4.3 s. A T1
weighted anatomical MRI (1  1  1.5 mm) was also acquired. In
each experiment, a total of 320 whole-brain EPIs were acquired
during a single session, of which the first eight volumes were
discarded to allow for T1 equilibration effects.
Data Analysis. The functional MRI (fMRI) data were analyzed by
using statistical parametric mapping (25). After realignment of all
of the functional (T2* weighted) volumes to the first volume in each
session, the structural (T1 weighted) MRI was coregistered into the
same space. The functional data were then smoothed by using a
6-mm (full width at half maximum) isotropic Gaussian kernel to
allow for corrected statistical inference. The evoked responses for
the different stimulus events were modeled by convolving a series
of delta (or stick) functions with a hemodynamic response function.
These functions were used as covariates in a general linear model,
together with a constant term and a basis set of cosine functions
with a cutoff period of 512 s to remove low-frequency drifts in the
blood oxygenation level-dependent signal. Linear contrasts were
applied to the parameter estimates for each event type to test for
specific effects (e.g., congruent fear versus congruent happy). The
resulting t statistic at every voxel constitutes a statistical parametric
map (SPM). Reported p values are corrected for the search volume
of regions of interest: e.g., 8 mm radius sphere for amygdala, 10 mm
radius sphere for posterior thalamus, and 6 mm radius sphere for
superior colliculus. The significance of activations outside regions
of interest was corrected for multiple comparisons across the entire
brain volume.
Experiment 1: The Influence of an Unseen Facial Expression on
Conscious Recognition. Here, the goal was to measure the interac-
tion between seen and consciously recognized stimuli and unseen
stimuli as a function of congruence and condition with a design
adapted from ref. 6.
Experimental Design. The material was based on static grayscale
images of six male and six female actors expressing fear (F) and
happiness (H), taken from a standard set of pictures of facial affect
(26). For one session (Session 1) a bilateral face presentation
condition was used: two pictures of the same individual were on
each trial shown simultaneously left and right of fixation. In the
incongruent pairs, the two faces expressed two different emotions
[fear left, happiness right (FH) or happiness left, fear right (HF)].
In the congruent pairs [happiness left, happiness right (HH) or fear
left, fear right (FF)], they expressed the same emotion. Each face
was 6.6° high and 4.4° wide, and its inner edge was 1.8° away from
the fixation point. In Session 2, a chimeric face presentation
condition was used. Two half faces separated by a vertical slit of 2
cm corresponding to a visual angle of 1.9° that was presented in a
central location. Incongruent chimeric faces presented different
expressions (FH or HF again) left and right of a vertical meridian
centered on the fixation point. Congruent ones had the same
expression on both sides (they were actually normal pictures of a
face expressing fear or happiness). Exposure duration was 1 s with
an interstimulus interval of 6 s. A two-alternative forced choice task
was used requesting GY to indicate by right hand button press which
expression he had perceived. Given that GY has no conscious
representation of data presented in his right hemifield, these
instructions amounted for him to a demand to report the expression
in the left face (in the bilateral condition) or the left half face (in
the chimeric condition). Within each experimental session (two full
faces or one chimeric face), the four types of faces (FF, FH, HH,
and HF) were presented in randomized order.
Results
Behavioral Results. For bilateral face presentations, identification of
fear presented in the critical left face was better when accompanied
by a congruent fearful face in the (unseen) right hemifield (pairs
FF: 18 correct responses of 22 recorded trials, i.e., 81.8%) than by
an incongruent happy face (pairs FH: 12 of 29 or 41.4% correct
responses). The difference is significant (2  6.57, P  0.025).
Identification of happiness was practically at chance level for both
congruent pairs (HH: 12 of 27 or 44.4% correct) and incongruent
ones (HF: 13 of 25 or 52.0% correct), with no significant difference
(2  1). The same pattern of results was obtained with chimeric
presentations. There was a clear congruency effect for fear iden-
tification (FF: 17 of 22 or 77.3% correct; FH: 12 of 29 or 41.4%
correct; 2  4.96, P  0.05), but none whatsoever for happiness
identification (HH: 12 of 27 or 44.4% correct; HF: 11 of 25 or 44.0%
correct; 2  1).
Brain Imaging Results. Conditions were entered into the analysis by
using the following abbreviations: F, fear; H, happiness. Left
position of the labels F or H indicates left field presentation; right
position indicates right field presentation. For example, FH corre-
sponds to the condition where a fear face is presented to the left and
a happy face to the right visual field. In Session 1, a condition-
specific effect for fear congruence (FF-FH)-(HH-HF) was ex-
pressed in left amygdala, pulvinar, and fusiform cortex. In Session
2 (hemifaces), a condition-specific fear congruency effect was
evident in right amygdala, superior colliculus, and in left posterior
fusiform gyrus (Fig. 1 and Table 1).
Discussion
The behavioral results indicate that recognition is above chance for
congruent conditions but drops significantly for presentation of an
incongruous face or half face in the blind field. GY’s performance
for conscious identification is marginally below that obtained
previously in behavioral testing (6), which we suggest partly reflects
the fact that behavioral testing took place inside the scanner. The
combined negative effects on performance of lateral, nonfoveal,
stimulus presentation, more demanding testing conditions, and
bilateral presentation probably accounts for this lower accuracy.
The fMRI data show that interhemispheric congruence effects
between seen and unseen facial expressions modulate brain activity








in superior colliculus, amygdala, and fusiform cortex. For Session 1,
our results show an increase in left amygdala activity when there is
fear congruence between hemifields. Thus, the presence of a fearful
face in the blind field enhances activation of left amygdala to the
seen fearful face, indicating an influence of the nonconscious on the
conscious recognition. This asymmetry we suggest is in tune with
psychological reality: Our unconscious desires and anxieties, for
example, influence our conscious thoughts and actions, but we
cannot simply consciously ‘‘think away’’ or remove our unconscious
fears. At the functional level, the asymmetry suggests that integra-
tion between perception and behavior may vary as a function of
whether the organism is engaged in (automatic) reflexive or
(controlled) reflective fear behavior.
We also observed fear congruence effects in fusiform cortex, an
area closely associated with overt face processing. Previously we
observed right fusiform gyrus activity associated with presentation
in the intact left visual field but no fusiform activity for blindfield
presentation (7). The present left anterior fusiform associated with
bilateral fear congruence of full faces is consistent with the role of
anterior fusiform gyrus for face memory (27). Unlike right fusiform
activity, left fusiform activity in this patient cannot have its origin
in striate cortex. Instead it may reflect a fear-related reentrant
modulation from left amygdala mediated by ipsilaterality of amyg-
dala-fusiform connections (28).
In Session 2 with hemifaces, the results show right amygdala and
the superior colliculus activation specific to fear congruence. A
previously undescribed contribution from the present study is that
these two structures are sensitive to the congruence between a seen
and an unseen fear expression. Superior colliculus-pulvinar-based
residual abilities of hemianopic patients are within a limited range
of spatial frequencies (16), which is also sufficient for recognition
of facial expressions in normal viewers (14, 29).
Experiment 2: Conscious and Nonconscious Processing of Facial Ex-
pressions and Affective Pictures. The purpose here was to provide a
direct comparison of nonconscious processing of facial expressions
and affective pictures to investigate whether an apparent privileged
processing seen for fear faces is also expressed for nonface stimuli
such as affective pictures. Our previous investigation of this issue
had yielded moderate positive results for recognition of unseen
affective pictures but a negative result as far as the crossmodal
influence of the visual images on processing emotion in the voice
was concerned (23). Because the difficulty in extrapolating conclu-
sions based on one method (behavioral and electrophysiological) to
another (fMRI), we wanted to assess independently whether af-
fective pictures were processed by using fMRI. For the purpose of
comparison, we used the same design as our previous fMRI study
Fig. 1. Experiment 1. SPMs for blindfield
presentation of fear. (a) Fear and happy
full faces: Fear congruency effect in left
amygdala (arrows) is shown as SPM super-
imposed on GY’s brain (Left and Middle)
and condition-specific parameter esti-
mates from a peak voxel in left amygdala
for each of the conditions (Right). (b) Fear
and happy half face: Fear congruence ef-
fect shown as SPM projected on GY’s brain
showing right amygdala (Left and Middle)
and parameter estimates from a peak voxel
in right amygdala for each of the condi-
tions (Right). Coordinates are given in Ta-
ble 1.
Table 1. Overview of xyz coordinates of activations obtained in the three experiments
Locus
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Intact field Blind field


















Amyg L 18, 6, 24* 20, 2, 20* 18, 2, 20* 20, 4, 20* 20, 2, 30*
Amyg R 26, 4, 12* 18, 2, 20* 26, 4, 12* 28, 0, 12* 28, 2, 20* 22, 8, 20*
Sup Coll 2, 38, 12** 0, 30, 8*
Pulvinar 2, 24, 10**u
Fusif g. L 28, 54, 12***u
F, fear; H, happiness; Amyg L, left amygdala; Amyg R, right amygdala; Sup Coll, superior colliculus; Fusif g. L, left fusiform gyrus. Abbreviations used for
presentation conditions: left position of F or H indicates left field presentation; right position indicates right field presentation. For example, FH corresponds
to the condition where a fear face is presented to the left and a happy face to the right visual field. *, P  0.05; **, P  0.01; ***, P  0.001. u, uncorrected;
otherwise all tests are corrected.
†Interaction effects of emotion (fearfulhappy) and stimulus category (facescene): Fearfulhappy face blind field  Fearfulhappy scene blind field.
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of affective blindsight for faces (7) and added a set of affective
pictures.
Experimental Design. Visual materials consisted of a set of black and
white photographs of facial expressions and a set of black and white
affective pictures. The face set contained 12 images (six individuals,
each of them once with a happy facial expression and once with a
fearful one). Affective pictures were 12 black and white images
selected from the International Affective Picture System (31).
There were six negative pictures (snake, pit bull, two spiders,
roaches, and shark; mean valence: 4.04) and six positive ones
(porpoises, bunnies, lion, puppies, kitten, and baby seal; mean
valence: 7.72). Image size was 6.6  4.4 inches, and images were
presented singly in either the left (intact) or right (blind) visual
hemifield by following a previously used procedure in separate
blocks corresponding to face and scene pictures (23). Horizontal
separation between the central fixation point and the inner edge of
the images was 4.0°. Stimulus duration was 1 s, and interstimulus
interval was 6 s. Stimulus onset was indicated by a circle appearing
around the central fixation cross. GY was instructed to indicate by
button press whether he found the image presented to his intact left
visual field fearful or happy. For presentation to his blind field, a
similar response was requested but GY was encouraged to answer
by making a guess.
Results and Discussion
Presentation in the intact field resulted in bilateral amygdala
activity for fearful faces, similar to a pattern observed in ref. 7. In
contrast, the corresponding contrast for seen pictures shows acti-
vation restricted to the left amygdala (see Fig. 2). When faces and
pictures were presented in the blind field, a fearful face evoked right
amygdala activity (Fig. 2) as shown previously and as also observed
in session 2 of Experiment 1 here. An ANOVA on the interaction
of emotion (fearfulhappy) and stimulus category (facescene)
showed a significant effect in right amygdala for fear faces in the
blind field condition (Fig. 2). The selectivity of these effects for
fearful, as opposed to happy faces, is consistent with ref. 7. Note that
in our previous study, bilateral activity was observed for blindfield
fear faces, but the laterality pattern for seen vs. unseen observed
here is consistent with results obtained by using a masking tech-
nique in normal viewers (13).
Our data suggest that a privileged processing for fear, perhaps by
a nonclassical cortical route, is restricted to faces. However, we
would caution that this conclusion might be premature. Research
on affective pictures has indicated amygdala response is weaker for
nonface stimuli (31). Autonomic reactivity, measured by skin
conductance responses, is also greater to facial expressions (32).
Faces are more primitive biological stimuli, and as such, they may
require very little cognitive mediation, whereas appraisal of the
emotional content of pictures requires deeper cognitive and se-
mantic processing (33) and may depend on interaction with intact
V1 in the later stages of scene processing (23).
There is, as yet, no clear consensus concerning laterality effects
in amygdala activation as a function of stimulus type. Activity
related to pictures and objects has been observed in the left
amygdala (34), bilaterally (32), and in right amygdala (35, 36). One
possibility is that left amygdala is more specialized for processing
arousal associated with affective pictures (37).
Experiment 3: The Influence of Unseen Facial Expressions and Affec-
tive Pictures on Conscious Recognition of Emotion in the Voice. The
perception and integration of emotional cues from both the face
and the voice is a powerful adaptive mechanism. A previous report
(20) showed that emotional voices influence how facial expressions
are perceived and that fear related emotional congruence between
face and voice is reflected in increased amygdala activity. We have
reason to believe that facial and vocal cues converge rapidly based
on studies where we recorded electrical brain responses (event-
related potentials) to presentation of facevoice pairs to the intact
and the blind visual field while subjects attend to the auditory part
of the audiovisual stimulus pair (23). Presentation of an audiovisual
stimulus with emotional incongruence between the visual and the
auditory component generated an increase in amplitude compared
to the congruent components, but this influence of an unseen
stimulus only obtained for faces and not for affective pictures
indicates that conscious recognition of the affective pictures may be
critical for this effect. In line with this approach, we predicted that
faces would influence processing of the emotional voices but that
affective pictures would not.
Experimental Design. In contrast with Experiment 2, in this exper-
iment all trials consisted of combinations of a visual stimulus (either
a face or an affective picture) paired with an emotional voice
fragment. Materials and stimuli were the same as described in ref.
23. Briefly, the visual materials consisted of 12 facial expressions
and 12 affective pictures. Auditory materials consisted of a total of
12 bisyllabic neutral words spoken in either a happy or a fearful tone
of voice lasting for 400 ms (three male and three female actors
each with emotional tones of voice expressing either fear or
happiness). Audiovisual pairs were constructed by combining the
stimuli of the two visual conditions (12 faces or 12 affective pictures)
with the two types of auditory stimuli (happy of fearful words),
amounting to 48 trials. Thus, a trial always consisted of a visual and
an auditory component presented simultaneously. In session 1, all
images (faces or scenes) were fearful and they were presented
simultaneously with a voice fragment, which had either a fearful
(congruent condition) or happy tone of voice (incongruent condi-
tion). In session 2, all images (faces or scenes) were happy while the
voice again had either a fearful (incongruent) or happy (congruent)
tone. A trial lasted for 1 s and the interstimulus interval was 6 s.
Fig. 2. Experiment 2. (Top and Middle) An SPM for the interaction of
emotion (fearfulhappy) and stimulus category (facescene). The SPM is based
upon the contrast of fearfulhappy face blind field  fearfulhappy scene
blind field and shows a significant effect in the right amygdala. (Bottom) The
parameter estimates for the response in the peak voxel in right amygdala for
each of the conditions, namely, for lanes: 1, fearful face intact field; 2, fearful
face blind field; 3, happy face intact field; 4, happy face blind field; 5, fearful
scene intact field; 6, fearful scene blind field; 7, happy scene intact field; 8,
happy scene blind field. Coordinates are given in Table 1.








Auditory stimuli were delivered over MRI-compatible head-
phones. GY’s explicit task was to indicate whether the voice
belonged to a male or to a female speaker, making responses by
button presses with his right hand.
Results and Discussion
As in the previous study by using normal viewers, we choose a
behavioral task requiring gender decisions, which turned attention
away from the emotional task variable, and GY was near ceiling for
this task. As expected, the fMRI analysis shows that fear facevoice
congruence in the intact field (see Fig. 3a) is reflected in left
amygdala activation, consistent with our previous results reported
for neurologically intact observers (20). The critical finding is that
the fear facevoice congruence effects in the blind field are
reflected in enhanced activity in right amygdala. This previously
uncharacterized result extends the significance of right amygdala
activation for blind fear to include the influence of auditory
information and, thus, audiovisual multisensory fear perception.
Finally, the interaction between emotion and stimulus category in
the blind field shows that fear congruency (Fig. 3b) is also reflected
in enhanced superior collicular activity, pointing to a role for
superior colliculus in the combined voice-unseen face processing of
fear stimuli.
The present data also throw light on some previous findings. For
example, in a previous study of audiovisual emotion, we observed
left lateralized amygdala activity and increased right fusiform
cortex activity (20). One possible explanation was that left amygdala
may be related to the use of linguistic stimuli. Interestingly, the
present finding of right amygdala activation indicates that this
relation with language need not be the case and that typical left
lateralized language areas need not necessarily intervene to facil-
itate perceiving emotion in the voice. Next, the absence of audio-
visual emotion integration with affective scenes is consistent with
the notion that pairings of this type may require higher cognitive
processing, such that a more semantically demanding integration
process depends on feedback from higher cognitive areas to earlier
visual areas involving intact striate cortex (23). Finally, our results
show that superior colliculus plays a role in integrating unseen fear
faces with emotional prosody. This finding, together with a similar
role of amygdala for audiovisual fear stimuli, indicates a subcortical
contribution in which amygdala and superior colliculus both play a
role. One may argue that perception of fear expressions in face and
voice are naturally linked in the production of fear responses and
both share the same abstract underlying representation of fear-
specific affect programs. Thus, viewing a facial expression may
automatically activate a representation of its auditory correlate
and vice versa (38). Electrophysiological recordings of the time
course of the cross-modal bias from the face to the voice indicate
that integration takes place during auditory perception of emo-
tion (39, 40). The present finding also adds to previous findings
that face expressions can bias perception of an affective tone of
voice even when the face is not attended to (41) or not perceived
consciously (23).
General Discussion
Taken together, the three experiments show that amygdala activa-
tion, after presentation of facial expressions of fear presented to the
cortically blind field, remains robust irrespective of whether con-
flicting emotional cues are provided by a consciously perceived
facial expression or an emotional voice.
Automatic Fear Face Processing in the Amygdala. Our three exper-
iments each provide converging evidence of robust nonconscious
recognition of fearful faces and associated automatic activation
of amygdala. Our testing procedure provides a measure of
automatic bias from the unattended stimulus on task perfor-
mance and task-related brain activation. The biasing stimulus
was not only unattended as in previous studies (4, 42) but was not
consciously perceived. In this sense, our paradigm combines
attention-independent processing and processing without visual
consciousness.
In normal subjects, increased condition-specific covariation of
collicular-amygdala responses to masked CS (as opposed to
unmasked) fear conditioned faces was observed without a signifi-
cant change in mean collicular and amygdala responses (1). In
contrast, in patient GY, we previously observed a higher superior
colliculus and amygdala activity associated with unseen fear ex-
pressions (masked CS) (7). There are methodological differences
between the two studies, and an important one concerns central
presentation in normals versus lateral presentation in GY. This
difference by itself may account for the higher collicular activity in
GY given the role of superior colliculus in spatial orientation.
A Special Status for Faces? Our results do not provide evidence for
nonconscious processing of stimuli other than faces and, thus,
suggest a special status for faces. But further research on this issue
is needed before we can conclude that faces are indeed unique in
conveying fear via a subcortical pathway. The special status of faces
Fig. 3. Experiment 3. (a) Fear congruence effects in the blind field showing right amygdala activation. (b) Interaction effects: (Voice-congruent fear face
–voice-incongruent fear face blind field)  (Voice-congruent fear scene –voice-incongruent fear scene blind field) showing superior colliculus for lanes: 1, fearful
face intact field with voice congruent; 2, fearful face intact with voice incongruent; 3, fearful face blind with voice congruent; 4, fearful face blind field with
voice incongruent; 5, fearful scene intact field with voice congruent; 6, fearful scene intact field with voice incongruent; 7, happy scene blind field with voice
congruent; 8, happy scene blind field with voice incongruent. (b Lower Right) Condition-specific parameter estimates from peak voxel in superior colliculus.
Coordinates are given in Table 1.
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may relate to properties such as overall face configuration but also
to the individual components. Fearful eyes appear to represent a
powerful automatic threat signal that has been highly conserved
throughout evolution, for example, in the owl butterfly’s use of eye
wing markings to ward off bird predators. Birds do not have a visual
cortex (like GY in his blind field), but they do have a homologue
of the superior colliculus, the optic tectum, again like GY, in the
blind field. Fearful eyes, therefore, may be a simple cue to which the
low-resolution visual abilities of superior colliculus are tuned (43,
44). Consistent with this view, an impairment in facial fear recog-
nition in a patient with amygdala damage compromises the ability
to make normal use of information from the eye region of faces
when judging emotions, a defect that may be traced to a lack of
spontaneous fixations on the eyes during free viewing of faces (45).
Furthermore, recent findings suggest that the sclera in fearful faces
is especially effective for recruiting amygdala activation (46) and
may be the specific signal rather than the face configuration that
makes some emotional faces very effective. Finally, facial expres-
sions are often imitated spontaneously (47), and this automatic
reaction may facilitate residual vision abilities, for example, by
compensating for lower recognition threshold. This mechanism
may incorporate viscero-motor signals into decision-making
processes.
Neurophysiology of Affective Blindsight. A different kind of chal-
lenge comes from understanding its neurophysiologic basis. The
possibility that the remarkable visual abilities of cortically blind
patients reflect residual processing in islands of intact striate cortex
now seems extremely unlikely based on findings from brain imaging
(24, 48).
Facial expressions have been suggested as too subtle and complex
to survive processing in case of striate cortex damage (48). Many
categories of information provided by the face are indeed subtle like
age, gender, trustworthiness, attractiveness, and personal identity.
But facial expressions can still be recognized when stimuli are much
degraded. For example, the facial expression in images with spatial
frequencies 8 cycles can still be recognized almost faultlessly (14,
15), and it is interesting to note that this filtering is within the range
of spatial frequencies available to the majority of cortically blind
patients (16).
The second claim about the subcortical route, based on work in
rodents, concerns its comparative speed in contrast with the slower
processes in the occipitotemporal cortex. The earliest evidence for
discrimination between facial expressions was at 80–110 ms after
stimulus and located in midline occipital cortex (49–51). Record-
ings from amygdala in animals (50) and in humans suggest that the
earliest activity is 220 ms (47). But interestingly, a patient study
with single-unit recording reports discrimination between faces and
pictures expressing fear or happiness in orbitofrontal cortex ob-
served after only 120 ms (52).
One possibility is that in GY, after his occipital lesion at age 7,
experience-dependent changes have taken place in superior col-
liculus (SC). This finding would be consistent with reports from
animal studies. The number of SC cells with enhanced responses to
visual targets in monkeys increases after striate cortex lesions (53).
This postlesion modification of superior colliculus connectivity may
explain higher sensitivity and higher functionality of the subcortical
pathway as suggested in refs. 54 and 55. Yet in the present
experiments, higher sensitivity is condition-specific and does not
obtain for happy facial expressions. Moreover, the laterality of SC
activity observed in GY (coactivation right SC-R amygdala) is
similar to what is reported in normal subjects viewing masked fear
expressions. This lateralization speaks to a functional specificity of
amygdala route. Thus, the argument from postlesion plasticity in SC
needs to account for this selectivity. Interestingly, in research with
diffusion tensor imaging, we found no volumetric difference be-
tween left and right superior colliculus in GY (B.d.G., D. Tuch, L.
Weiskrantz, and N. Hadjikhani, unpublished data).
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